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Abstract 
What does it mean for a hypothesis to be ad hoc? One prominent account has it that ad 
hoc hypotheses have no independent empirical support. Others have viewed ad hoc 
judgements as subjective. Here I critically review both of these views and defend my 
own Coherentist Conception of Ad hocness by working out its conceptual and descriptive 
attractions.  
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1 Introduction	
It is widely agreed—amongst scientists and philosophers alike—that a good 
hypothesis ought not to be ad hoc. Consequently, a theory that requires ad hoc 
hypotheses in order to overcome empirical tests ought to be less acceptable for a 
rational agent than a theory that does without (or with fewer) ad hoc 
amendments. But what precisely does it mean for a hypothesis to be ad hoc? 
This is what this paper is about.  
 Concept clarification is one of the central tasks of philosophy. Usually, it 
involves an explicandum and an explicatum, viz. a pre-analytic concept that is 
to be explicated and a concept which explicates this concept, respectively 
(Carnap 1950). For example, the concept TEMPERATURE explicates our pre-
analytic concepts of WARM and COLD, and allows us to be much more precise 
and clear in the way we communicate with each other. In the case of ad 
hocness, the pre-analytic concept is something along the lines of “was 
introduced for the sole purpose of ‘saving’ a theory which faces observational 
anomalies”. Whilst this hunch may suffice for all practical purposes, it only tells 
us something about why ad hoc hypotheses are used; it tells us about 
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motivations. What we should want as philosophers, however, is an account of ad 
hocness that can tell us something about why ad hoc hypotheses ought to be 
avoided in theory choice. In other words, it should tell us why ad hoc 
hypotheses are epistemically deficient.  
 It goes without saying that a good account of ad hoc judgements in 
science must take into consideration how scientists actually use ad hoc 
judgements. Traditionally, discussions of ad hocness have been informed by 
historical case studies. The present paper will follow this tradition. There might 
be other ways of investigating the meaning of ad hocness by descriptive means 
(interviews with living scientists?), but the history of science offers an 
established way of seeking descriptive accuracy of philosophical accounts. At 
the same time, pure historical description of ad hoc judgements as made by 
scientists will not suffice either. Scientists generally do not explicate what 
grounds their judgements; they just make them. Thus, some substantive 
philosophical work is indispensable in the project of determining the meaning 
of ad hocness by descriptive means.  
There are important ramifications of the project of explicating the 
meaning of ad hocness. First, it affects philosophical theories of theory-
confirmation, since it will tell us about the reasons for why theories that are 
amended by ad hoc hypotheses should receive less confirmation than theories 
that are not so amended. Since, second, the realism debate proceeds on the basis 
of a certain view of theory-confirmation, an explication of ad hocness has the 
potential for influencing to what kinds of theories realists commit. Although the 
recent realism debate has focused on novel success as a necessary condition for 
realist commitment, non-ad hocness is recognized as equally important by some 
commentators (Psillos 1999). Others even see the rationale of novel success 
deeply tied to the notion of ad hocness: “it is wrong to regard the downgrading 
of ad hoc explanations and the apparent upgrading of genuine predictions as 
two separate methodological phenomena—they are at root the same 
phenomena” (Worrall 1989, 148).  
 Philosophers of science were once very interested in specifying the 
epistemic meaning of ad hocness; mostly in the 1960-1980s. The currently 
perhaps by far most popular epistemic account of ad hocness is the view that 
associates ad hocness with the lack of independent support. According to that 
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view, a hypothesis is ad hoc when it has no empirical support other than the 
evidence it was invoked for. However, not everybody agrees that ad hocness is 
an epistemic concern in the first place. Instead, some have viewed judgements 
about a hypothesis being ad hoc as subjective aesthetic judgements with no 
relevance to theory confirmation.  
 This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I critically review two 
prominent explications of ad hocness, namely independent testability and 
independent support. In Section 3 I introduce subjectivist accounts of ad 
hocness. In Section 4 I propose and advocate my own account of ad hocness, the 
Coherentist Conception, by working out its conceptual and descriptive 
attractions. In Section 5 I argue in detail that the history of one of the most 
pragmatic ad hoc hypotheses, namely the Lorentz-Fitzgerald contraction 
hypothesis, supports my account. I conclude this paper in Section 6. 
2 Extant	accounts	of	ad	hocness	
Two popular ways of explicating the meaning of ad hocness is in terms of 
independent testability and independent support. In this section, I will discuss 
these two proposals in turn.  
2.1 Ad	hocness	as	lack	of	independent	testability	
The philosopher with arguably the biggest impact outside the discipline, Karl 
Popper, was very much driven by the attempt to formulate conditions that 
would disqualify as unscientific the ad hoc maneuvers of psychoanalysis and 
other alleged pseudo-sciences, and was once even described as “introducing 
new, non-justificationist criteria for appraising scientific theories based on anti-
ad hocness.” Lakatos (cf. Popper 1959a, 42, 1978 39). Popper believed that ad 
hoc hypotheses would decrease the falsifiability of the theory they were 
introduced to save (Popper 1959a, 82f.) and that “degrees of ad hocness are 
related (inversely) to degrees of testability and significance” (Popper 1959b). If a 
hypothesis which is added to a theory entails only the evidence that is 
troublesome to this theory, then the falsifiability of the theory is decreased: 
there is one state of affairs less that could threaten the theory in question. On 
the other hand, the falsifiability of the theory is increased when the added 
hypothesis makes new predictions. This is why Popper also claimed that ad hoc 
hypotheses “cannot be tested independently” (1974, 986), i.e., they cannot be 
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tested other than on the basis of the evidence they were introduced to account 
for. At least this is the idea. Barnes (2008, 11), following Bamford (1993, 349-50) 
has—I think rightly—questioned Popper’s alleged connection between ad hoc 
hypotheses and decreased testability. For example, it is for example not 
plausible that the hypothesis “bread nourishes” when amended to “all bread 
nourishes except that grown in a particular region of France” after the relevant 
discovery, would result in a decrease in testability. Independent testability also 
seems not the right way of thinking about one of the most emblematic ad hoc 
hypotheses, namely the Lorentz-FitzGerald contraction hypothesis (LFC), 
famously introduced to save the aether theory from refutation in the face of the 
famous Michelson and Morley aether drift null result.  
There is strong evidence that contemporary scientists regarded the LFC 
as an ad hoc hypothesis. Einstein, for instance, wrote about LFC that “[t]his 
manner of theoretically trying to do justice to experiments with negative results 
through ad hoc contrived hypotheses is highly unsatisfactory” (Einstein in 
Warburg 1915, 707). To Michelson, who was initially actually quite keen to 
explain away his null result in favor of the ether theory felt that "such a 
hypothesis seems rather artificial" (cited in Holton 1969, 139). Even Lorentz, 
who had developed the LFC, admitted that it first appeared ‘far-fetched’ and 
that it depended on an assumption (namely that the same laws apply to 
intermolecular forces that apply to electrical ones) which ‘there is no reason to 
make’ (Lorentz 1895 in Einstein et al. 1952, 6). In response to criticism by 
Poincare in 1900, Lorentz also admitted that “[surely] this course of inventing 
special hypotheses for each new experimental result is somewhat artificial” 
(Lorentz 1904, ibid., 12-13). 
 Although Popper in his Logic of Scientific Discovery mentioned the LFC as 
the only example for his claim that ad hoc hypotheses are not independently 
testable, Grünbaum (1959) pointed out that LFC actually did entail an 
independently testable prediction. More specifically, it entailed a positive aether 
drift result that was different from the positive result implied by the 
unmodified aether theory. There even was an experiment, namely the so-called 
Kennedy-Thorndike experiment, which falsified this consequence of the LFC.1 
                                                
1 The LFC had it that matter moving through the ether contracts in the direction of motion by 
the same laws governing the contraction of interference patterns. Whereas the Michelson-
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In response, Popper conceded that the LFC could not be disqualified as ad hoc 
on the basis of it not being independently testable.2 The conclusion Grünbaum 
(1976) drew was this: ad hoc hypotheses can have independent consequences, 
but when they do, these consequences have no support (because no relevant 
evidence has yet been gathered), or they have been shown to be false at the time 
at which the hypothesis is judged ad hoc.  
2.2 Ad	hocness	as	lack	of	independent	support	
The idea that a hypothesis needs independent support for it to not be judged ad 
hoc is extremely popular amongst philosophers (e.g. Zahar 1973, Schaffner 
1974, Leplin 1975, Lakatos 1978, Scerri and Worrall 2001, Worrall 2002, Sober 
2008).3 However, there is again historical evidence which speaks against such a 
view. With regards to our example of the contraction hypothesis, the historian 
Holton remarks that the independent predictions of the LFC were “not of real 
interest in any case; they were not urged as tests that would decide on its 
acceptability” (Holton 1969, 177).  
                                                
Morley experiment showed that the speed of light is independent of the orientation of the 
experimental apparatus, the Kennedy-Thorndike experiment showed that it was independent 
also of the velocity of the apparatus. For more details see e.g. (Janssen 2002b).   
2 Popper nevertheless held onto the independent testability account and claimed that the LFC 
was at least less independently testable (and therefore more ad hoc) than Einstein’s special 
theory of relativity (which he considered at hoc to some degree too) (Popper 1959b). 
3 A very influential account of ad hocness which embraces the “no independent support” 
condition is Leplin’s (1975). Apart from this condition, Leplin also (amongst a dozen necessary 
and jointly sufficient conditions) argues for the so-called “non-fundamentality condtion”, 
according to which “there are problems other than [anomalous phenomenon] E confronting 
[theory] T which there is good reason to hold are connected with E [in certain ways]”. This 
makes it impossible to apply Leplin’s account to cases in which (at a particular point in time) 
there are no other problems or anomalies than E. But surely, a good account of ad hocness 
should allow for such cases. Also, there seems little reason to suppose a priori (as Leplin does) 
that every time a theory is considered ad hoc, the anomalous phenomenon can in fact be 
connected with other phenomena (by a more unified theory). This may be so in some cases, but 
it shouldn’t be presumed for all cases. As another influential account of ad hocness that 
embraced the no independent support view of ad hocness, we should here also mention Lakatos’s 
(1978), which distinguished between three senses of ad hoc hypotheses (with regards to a 
research programme): ad hoc1 = the hypothesis makes no new predictions; ad hoc2 = the 
predictions a made by a hypothesis are not confirmed; ad hoc3 = the hypothesis does not is “not 
form an integral part of the positive heuristics” (fn 1 on p. 112). The first and the second sense 
are covered by my discussion in this and the previous section. A discussion of the third sense 
would also lead us too far astray.  
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Against the independent support idea of ad hocness, one may also 
appeal to an argument by Barnes (2005) made against Scerri and Worrall (2001) 
in the context of predictivism (the thesis that novel success counts more than 
accommodative success). Suppose with Worrall that creationists, when 
presented with fossils seemingly undermining the creationist doctrine, might 
respond with a ‘Gosse dodge’: fossils are just God’s playful writings in stone, 
possibly testing our faith. With Worrall one might think that the Gosse dodge is 
ad hoc because it has no independent support. However, suppose we view the 
Gosse dodge as a general hypothesis about all fossils. Then the Gosse dodge 
would not only be about the particular fossils for which the Gosse dodge has 
been invented, but also about other fossils throughout the world and fossils yet 
to be discovered. Arguably, those other fossils, once discovered, would be 
independent support for the Gosse dodge. Yet the Gosse dodge is clearly ad 
hoc, regardless (807). One may be unimpressed with this toy example; we will 
consider a more realistic example in a moment.4  
Proponents of the independent support view of ad hocness have 
repeatedly appealed to the discovery of the planet Neptune to make their case 
(Worrall 2002). In order to accommodate a discrepancy in the orbit of Uranus, 
Adams and Le Verrier, independently from each other, postulated another 
planet in the vicinity of Uranus in 1845-46. Neptune was subsequently 
discovered in 1846. Proponents of the independent support view of ad hocness 
have taken this to confirm their view (Worrall 2002): the Neptune hypothesis 
was introduced ad hoc in order to save Newtonian mechanics from refutation, 
but was rendered non-ad hoc when it received independent confirmation via 
the discovery of Neptune. However, as Leplin (1982) has pointed out, there is 
no evidence whatsoever that the scientific community at the time regarded the 
                                                
4 One might for example object to this example on the basis of (i) the vagueness of the Gosse 
dodge and (ii) the insufficiency of independence of the support from other fossils. As to the first 
point, one may criticise that the Gosse dodge is not really falsifiable and therefore should not be 
taken seriously as a scientific hypothesis in the first place. As to the second point, one may 
demand on behalf of the proponents of the independent support account, that empirical 
support must be qualitatively significantly different for it to be independent. I sympathize with 
both points. Yet I do share the crucial intuition that independent support for a hypothesis is not 
sufficient for rendering it non-ad hoc.  
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postulation of Neptune ad hoc, or somehow methodologically unsound.5 But if 
the postulation and discovery of Neptune really is no example for an ad hoc 
hypothesis, then it cannot lend credence to the independent support condition 
of ad hocness, or to any account of ad hocness for that matter.6 Moreover, it can 
then also not be the case that introducing a hypothesis to save a theory from 
refutation is sufficient for that hypothesis to be ad hoc. Something else is 
needed.  
The independent support view of ad hocness is very persistent. In the 
most recent contribution on the topic of ad hocness, Friederich et al. (2014) 
discuss several judgments by physicists (and some philosophers) about the 
Higgs mechanism (HM) of the standard model in particle physics being ad hoc. 
Friederich at el. list the following features of the HM that arguably underlie 
physicists’ ad hoc judgments: (i) the HM leads to a large number of free 
parameters for the particle masses that are not determined in a principled 
fashion but need to be put in ‘by hand’ on the basis of experimental results, (ii) 
there are no known fundamental scalar particles in physics apart from the 
Higgs boson, (iii) the symmetry breaking of the HM, contrary to all other known 
cases of symmetry breaking, is implemented not dynamically but by fiat,7 and (iv) 
the fact that the bare mass of the Higgs particle is ‘fine-tuned’ to its interaction 
mass in an “unnatural way” (by 34 orders of magnitude) is unexplained.8 This 
is known as the ‘fine tuning’ or ‘naturalness’ problem and, according to 
Friederich et al, “is widely regarded as the most severe” argument against the 
“fundamental scalar character” of the Higgs field.9 In other words, the HM has 
                                                
5 See for example Grant (1852, 164-201) and Grosser (1962). Bamford (1996), similarly, notes that 
“[t]here was no theoretical objection, however, to a planet located at some intermediate distance 
beyond Uranus” (216).  
6 Incidentally, it is interesting to note with Leplin (1975 314, fn. 17) that Lorentz appears to have 
regarded the question of whether or not the LFC was ad hoc independently of the question of 
whether or not there ever could be (positive) experimental tests for it (Lorentz 1885 in Einstein 
et al. 1952, 6). We shall return to this point later in the paper (Section 5).  
7 Symmetry breaking normally is due to composite rather than fundamental fields. Only in the 
former case can it be dynamical.  
8 In quantum field theory any experimentally determined particle mass is understood as the 
sum of the ‘bare’ mass and the ‘interaction mass’, due to the interaction of the particle with 
vacuum fluctuations.  
9 Friederich et al. mention two further points: that a non-zero Higgs field in a vacuum is 
conceptually problematic and ‘triviality’. The first of these points, Friederich et al. argue, makes 
a false presupposition: the Higgs field in the vacuum actually is zero. The second concerns the 
position of the so-called “Landau pole”, basically a limit of the standard model to certain energy 
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a number of arbitrary, theoretically unmotgivated, features. Interestingly this is 
also what Weinberg, in his original paper, expressed when he conceded that 
“[…] our model has too many arbitrary features for these predictions [regarding 
the electroweak “mixing angle”]10 to be taken very seriously” (Weinberg 1967, 
1265-66). It is this aspect of arbitrariness that appears to underlie physicists’ 
judgment that HM is ad hoc.  
Friederich et al. conclude their analysis by announcing “the end of the ad 
hoc character of the [HM]11 due to the recent discovery [of the Higgs particle]” 
(3914). More specifically, they argue that HM is no longer ad hoc, because “the 
most crucial characteristic of an ad hoc hypothesis”, which for them is the lack 
of independent support, “is no longer obeyed” (3913). Yet at the same time they 
note that  
Many physicists […] now seem to be ready to accept the [HM] as part of physical 
reality. On the other hand, most of them seem to be not ready to conclude that 
the [aforementioned] criticisms of the [HM] were unfounded […] [since] the 
experimental confirmation of the [HM] does not solve any of these problems 
(3913; original emphasis). 
But if the reasons for judging the HM ad hoc have not been addressed by the 
Higgs discovery, then why should we think that the ad hoc status of the HM 
has changed? The fact that the HM describes a particle that exists is not enough. 
In the history of science, there have been many ad hoc hypotheses of real 
entities or phenomena (such as the Planck hypothesis of black body radiation; 
see 4.1). Yet Friederich et al. seem to implicitly rule out this option, as they go 
on to suggest only two possible reactions to the Higgs discovery: either 
supersymmetry theories incorporating the Higgs boson as one amongst several 
                                                
scales. The Landau pole for the standard model depends on the observed Higgs mass. For the 
currently observed Higgs mass, the Landau pole turns out to be entirely absent. This result, 
Friederich et al. point out, can be generated only “if the self-coupling of the Higgs boson is 
assumed to be vanishing, i.e. trivial, while this self-coupling must be non-vanishing for the HM 
to generate non-vanishing particle masses”. For reasons of simplicity, I will leave out those 
points in my discussion.   
10 The mixing angle of the Weinberg model, which also became known as Weinberg angle, 
indicates the relative strengths of the neutral and charged weak interactions and the masses of 
the Z and W bosons. 
11 Instead of HM, Friederich et al. use the abbreviation SMHM for Standard Model Higgs 
Mechanism.  
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such particles turn out correct, or the HM will no longer be considered ad hoc.12 
But again, I think this is a false dichotomy: it may well be that HM is and will 
remain ad hoc despite the discovery of the Higgs particle until a better 
theoretical device in agreement with the facts has been constructed.13 In fact, 
given that none of the original problems of the HM (which led to the ad hoc 
judgements) has been alleviated, this seems to be the more accurate picture.  
In sum, the independent support view of ad hocness is in trouble. 
Physicists’ view of the HM, the (hypothetical) Gosse dodge, and (I would 
argue) the LFC show that a hypothesis can be ad hoc even when it does (or if it 
would) have independent support. Conversely, the Neptune hypothesis—often 
used as simple illustration for the independent support account—was never 
deemed ad hoc, even at a time when it had no independent support. The lack of 
independent support is thus neither necessary nor sufficient for a hypothesis to 
be considered ad hoc.  
3 Subjectivist	accounts	of	ad	hocness		
In contrast to the two accounts discussed in the previous two sections, there are 
also approaches that deny that ad hocness can be explicated in one particular 
                                                
12 Friederich et al. offer quotes from three physicists commenting on two of the problems of the 
HM as evidence for the second option. But none of these quotes seems to support this view. 
Friederich et al. refer to a review article on the status of supersymmetry by Feng (2013), a blog 
entry by Krämer (2013), and a paper on the hierarchy problem by Wetterich (2012). Feng 
concludes his paper by saying that “weak-scale supersymmetry [motivated by the problem of 
naturalness, amongst other things] is neither unscathed, nor is it dead”, which would seem to 
suggest that, despite the Higgs discovery, he has not given up the hope that naturalness will 
eventually be achieved in sypersymmetric theories. There certainly is no evidence that he 
would regard the HM as less ad hoc than before the Higgs discovery. The same is true of 
Friederich et al.’s quote of Krämer: Krämer says only that the lack of evidence for 
supersymmetry in the results of the Large Hardron Collider experiments means that the search 
for theories incorporating naturalness may have to be given up and not that theories without 
naturalness, such as the HM, are now fully embraced as non-ad hoc because the Higgs has been 
found (as Friederich et al. seem to want to suggest). Lastly, it is worth noting that the quote by 
Wetterich, which Friederich et al. use to argue for a reevaluation of the fine-tuning problem due 
to the Higgs discovery, is truncated and in fact starts with “It has been shown long ago…”, 
where Wetterich cites an article of his from 1984, i.e., 28 (!) years before the discovery of the 
Higgs particle.  
13 Physcists seem indeed keen to develop such an alternative. It is for example well known that 
many physicists were rather disappointed that no further Higgs-like bosons were found at the 
LHC at CERN, as required by supersymmetry theories. See e.g. Overbye (2012) and Heilprin 
(2013). String theory research, despite its problems, also still holds the promise of a theoretically 
more appealing theory than the standard model.  
10 | P a g e  
 
way. Such approaches tend to treat ad hocness as subjective projections or 
aesthetic judgements. 
In a remarkable paper discussing the role of the Michelson-Morley 
experiment, the historian Holton noted that scientists’ judgments about a 
hypothesis being ad hoc are often accompanied by aesthetic terms such as 
‘artificial’, ‘contrived’, ‘strange’, ‘surprising’, and the like (Holton 1973, 327).14 
Holton also claims that ad hoc judgments are highly context-dependent, and 
vary inter- and even intra-subjectively. That is, what might be regarded as ad 
hoc by some may be seen as non-ad hoc by others, and what might be at 
regarded as ad hoc one point in time, according to these authors, might be 
regarded as methodologically sound at a later point in time, even by a single 
person (Holton 1973, 176-183). In conclusion, Holton urged that philosophical 
analysis “must be supplemented by an understanding of matters of scientific 
taste and feeling” (183). Recently Hunt (2012) reaffirms that “scientists’ aesthetic 
sense or ‘feeling’ governs their judgments in this matter [of ad hocness]” and 
that the answer to the question of whether a hypothesis is ad hoc is “largely in 
the eye of the beholder” (13). On the subjectivist account, whether a hypothesis 
is deemed ad hoc or not (by anyone) has no epistemic bearing. Hunt 
accordingly concludes that “at the end of the day there seem to be no ad hoc 
hypotheses and no non–ad hoc hypotheses, only hypotheses—full stop” (Hunt 
2012, 13). 
 I think it is highly questionable that the subjectivist account accurately 
represents scientists’ views of the matter. Contrary to Holton and Hunt I think 
it is quite obvious that scientists do indeed care about whether or not their 
hypotheses are ad hoc and that they do view ad hoc hypotheses as 
epistemically deficient (see e.g. our discussion of the LFC above). Furthermore, 
if ad hoc hypotheses would be just as good as any other non-ad hoc hypotheses 
then there would be very little constraint on theorizing other than saving the 
phenomena. Any theory facing anomalies could be patched up at will without 
that being objectionable. Since any theory can save any phenomena when 
                                                
14 Holton even claims that an ad hoc judgment need not be pejorative and that there are 
“acceptable ad hoc hypotheses”. Holton provides no evidence for this claim other than stating 
that scientists sometimes describe them positively (Holton 1973, 327).  
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amended ad hoc, how could scientists then rationally deliberate about which 
theory to adopt? 
 Contrary to how the subjectivists would have it, the inter-subjective and 
intra-subjective variance of ad hoc judgements, if it is real, does not entail the 
conclusion that the subjectivists try to establish. Scientists make mistakes. Thus, 
when scientists disagree as to whether a hypothesis is ad hoc or not, some 
might scientists might simply be wrong. And scientists might change their 
minds about the ad hoc status of a hypothesis for all the wrong reasons. This is of 
course not to say that none of the reported variance should be taken seriously. 
On the contrary. What I will argue, though, is that we don’t have to go all the 
way subjectivist and relativist to accommodate such judgments. 
4 A	coherentist	conception	of	ad	hocness		
Let us start out with another example. The Ptolemaic system of our planetary 
system famously used the theoretical device of epicycles: the planets were 
envisaged to move on circles whose centre in turn moved along the 
circumference of other circles around the central body, believed to be Earth. 
Although epicycles have become proverbial for ad hoc devices, it was not those 
to which Copernicus objected when criticizing the Ptolemaic system in his De 
revolutionibus. In fact, Copernicus himself made heavy use of them (Kuhn 
1957).15 Instead, what appears to have taken central stage in Copernicus’s 
objections to the Ptolemaic system were concerns about coherence:  
[Ptolemaic astronomers have not] been able […] to discern or deduce the 
principal thing - namely the shape of the universe and the unchangeable 
symmetry of its parts. With them it is as though an artist were to gather the 
hands, feet, head and other members for his images from diverse models, each 
part excellently drawn, but not related to a single body, and since they in no 
way match each other, the result would be a monster rather than a man. 
(Copernicus cited in Kuhn 1957, 137-8) 
I will specify what underlies Copernicus’s criticism further in a moment, but I 
take this to be prima facie evidence for what I call the Coherentist Conception of 
Ad Hocness (CCAH), according to which a hypothesis H is ad hoc, iff theory T 
                                                
15 Gingerich (1975) raises doubt that the numbers of epicycles can be determined unequivocally 
on any of the two systems.  
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and H do not cohere or H does not cohere with the accepted background 
theories B.16 More precisely,  
Definition of ad hocness: A hypothesis H, when introduced to save a theory T 
from empirical refutation by data E, is ad hoc, iff (i) E is evidence for H and 
(ii) H appears arbitrary in that H coheres neither with theory T nor with 
background theories B, i.e., neither T nor B provide good reason to believe 
that H (possibly specifying a particular value of a variable), rather than 
non-H (or some value other than the one specified by H).  
Condition (i) is trivially true for any ad hoc hypothesis, because ad hoc 
hypotheses get introduced to accommodate data in the first place. Condition (ii) 
prominently features coherence relations. Coherence has been described as a 
measure for “how well things hang together” (BonJour 1985). There is no 
agreement about what exactly coherence amounts to, but I will assume that if H 
coheres with T or B, T or B will give one good reason to believe that H, rather than 
non-H. These reasons, by virtue of being provided by T or B, will be theoretical 
reasons.17 How are theoretical reasons to believe H to be understood? And 
when are theoretical reasons good ones? 
For T or B to provide theoretical reasons to believe that H (rather than 
non-H), T or B must of course be logically consistent with H. But consistency is 
not sufficient for T or B to provide theoretical reasons to believe that H (rather 
than non-H), much as consistency is not sufficient for coherence.18 For T or B to 
provide theoretical reasons to believe that H, further conditions must be met. In 
the most straightforward case, T or B provide theoretical reasons to believe that 
H when H can be deduced from T or B. But there are other ways of theoretically 
                                                
16 McMullin (1998, 133-4) was perhaps the first to link ad hocness with the lack of coherence. Yet 
McMullin’s account remains sketchy. He appears to construe coherence in terms of causal-
unificationist explanation. In his discussion of the Copernican system in astronomy, he remarks 
about Copernicus that “he is saying that a theory that makes causal sense of a whole series of 
features of the planetary motions is more likely to be true than one that leaves these features 
unexplained.” (134). See the next section for more details about the unificationist account4.1. 
17 It should be noted that Leplin (1975) lists “H has no independent theoretical support” as one 
of altogether twelve (necessary and jointly sufficient) conditions for ad hocness, which he spells 
out as “no laws or principles of other still viable theories are such that their acceptance would 
constitute good reason for proposing the hypothesis” (11).  
18 In the following, I will, for the sake of simplicity, not write out the contrastive part of “reasons 
to believe H, rather than non-H”. Whenever I do use the simplified phrase, I nevertheless do 
want it to be understood in its complete version. The contrastive part ensures that the reasons 
provided by T or B are relevant reasons to believe that H.  
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justifying H. For example, a theoretical reason to believe that H might consist in 
an explanation for why H should be the case, by the lights of T or B. Such an 
explanation, in turn, could be causal, or it could consist of a subsumption of H 
under a regularity. T or B might also provide reasons to believe that H simply 
in virtue of ruling out scenarios inconsistent with H (as we shall see in a 
moment). In other words, I believe it is advisable to adopt a pluralist attitude 
towards the kinds of permissible theoretical reasons to believe that H, which T 
or B can provide, just as one might want to be pluralist about the nature of 
coherence relations. Lastly, we will demand that for theoretical reasons 
provided by T or B to be good ones, T or B will have to have empirical support. 
Otherwise, any arbitrarily cooked-up theory could be used to render an ad hoc 
hypothesis non-ad hoc. At the same time, it should be emphasized that, by the 
lights of CCAH, good reasons to believe that H can never be just empirical 
reasons alone, for they must be provided by T or B, and thereby be theoretical 
reasons. 
Let us return to Copernicus’s criticism of the Ptolemaic system. 
Copernicus explicated the aforementioned analogy by discussing a number of 
observations which, on the Ptolemaic system, had to be simply assumed, but for 
which the Copernican system gave good reasons to believe.19 Some of these 
observations were the maximum elongation of the inferior planets, i.e., the 
observational fact that Mercury and Venus are never observed beyond a certain 
angle from the apparent trajectory of the sun on the celestial sphere, i.e., the so-
called ecliptic (28° and 47°, respectively). In order to account for this fact, it was 
decreed in the Ptolemaic system that the centre of the epicycle on which an 
inner planet would move had to be fixed on a line connecting Sun and Earth. In 
the Copernican system, in contrast, the inner planets cannot possibly move 
away from the sun beyond a certain angle, because the inner planets’ orbits are 
encompassed by the Earth’s orbit around the sun (see Fig. 1).20   
                                                
19 Another point that was important to Copernicus was that the Ptolemaists had, with the 
deployment of eccentrics, departed from the Aristotelian principle of uniform motion. For a 
highly interesting discussion see (Miller 2014). 
20 For a detailed discussion see also (Janssen 2002a).  
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Fig. 1: The phenomenon of maximum elongation of the inner planets as explained in 
the Ptolemaic system (left) and the Copernican system (right). From (Kuhn 1957).  
The way in which the Ptolemaic system accommodates the phenomenon (E) of 
maximum elongation is clearly ad hoc, because neither the Ptolemaic system 
itself, nor the background theories at the time provided any good reasons to 
believe the hypothesis H that the centre of the inner planets’ epicycles must 
remain fixed on a line connecting the sun and Earth. H was arbitrary, since 
theoretically unmotivated. In contrast, in the Copernican system it is impossible 
for the inner planets to move beyond a certain angle away from the sun (as 
observed from the Earth), as it was surmised (H*) that the inner planets’ orbits 
are located inside Earth’s. The Copernican system thus provides excellent 
theoretical reasons to believe that H*, as H* follows straightforwardly from the 
Copernican system.21  
Before illustrating CCAH with further examples, let us clarify and 
compare CCAH to the extant accounts of ad hocness.  
4.1 Clarifications	and	comparison	with	other	accounts	
Let us first note that, contrary to a not too uncommon misconception, condition 
(i) of the CCAH is not sufficient for a hypothesis to be ad hoc. Consider again 
the stipulation of Neptune after the detection of irregularities in the orbit of 
Uranus (cf. Section 2). Again, contrary to folklore, there is no evidence that the 
hypothesis of Neptune was considered ad hoc before Neptune was discovered, 
even though it was introduced to save Newtonian mechanics. On the CCAH, 
the Neptune hypothesis was never ad hoc, because Newtonian mechanics did 
                                                
21 It may be noted that this example is compatible with both the independent testability and 
independent support notions of ad hocness. I do not claim, however, that these accounts are 
irreconcilable with all historical cases. But I do claim that my account does better in capturing 
some of the important cases which extant accounts don’t (see Section 2). Thanks to one of the 
referees of this journal for prompting me to clarify this point.  
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provide good reasons to believe that there was another planet in the vicinity of 
Uranus, given the irregularities of its orbit.  
My coherentist account of ad hocness is an objectivist account. When a 
hypothesis does not cohere either with T or B, H will be ad hoc. 
Contrapositively, when H coheres with T or B, it won’t be ad hoc. Yet, the 
account does allow for a subjective element in ad hoc judgements when it 
comes to weighting the relevant relations: some scientists might judge some 
connections of H to T or B more important than others. I’m therefore proposing 
an analogue to Kuhn’s model of theory-choice where individuals weigh 
objective theory properties according to their own (subjective) preferences 
(Kuhn 1977). Analogously in the case of coherence in my sense, scientists can 
legitimately differ about which coherence relations they consider to be more 
important. But that has no bearing on whether or not coherence relations obtain 
between H and T or B. Accordingly, the judgement that some hypothesis H is 
ad hoc when as a matter of actual fact H does cohere with T or B would be a 
false judgements. Subjectivist accounts of ad hocness (Section 3) have no such 
restrictions. My account thus sets clear limits to the legitimacy of ad hoc 
judgements. 
Relatedly, as we saw, proponents of a subjectivist account of ad hocness 
have cited degrees of ad hocness as evidence for ad hoc judgements being 
entirely aesthetic (Section 3). Yet, once again, one can admit the former without 
drawing the latter (radical) conclusion. CCAH too allows for degrees of ad 
hocness: the stronger the coherence between H and T or B, the less ad hoc H. 
The strength of coherence may perhaps be gauged both in terms of number and 
quality of relations. That is, the more and the stronger the theoretical reasons 
for believing H, as provided by T or B, the less ad hoc H. It is also worth 
noticing that degrees of ad hocness allow us to say one theory ought to be 
preferred over another, regarding ad hocness, even if neither theory manages 
entirely without ad hoc hypotheses: one theory might just invoke fewer ad hoc 
hypotheses than the other. In fact, I think one might question whether there is 
any prominent scientific theory which does entirely without ad hoc 
assumptions.  
Take again the Copernican system: it did not manage to do entirely 
without ad hoc assumptions. For example, it is a consequence of the Copernican 
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system that one should be able to observe a parallax shift, namely an apparent 
shift in the position of stars, due to the observer’s changing positions on Earth 
moving around the sun. Yet, the effect could not be observed up until the early 
19th century due to technological limitations (telescopes were not advanced 
enough at the time). Copernicus thus had to invoke the idea that the stars were 
in fact much further away from us than generally thought at the time. However, 
this hypothesis was incoherent with the accepted background theories of the 
time and therefore ad hoc. This was just one of the reasons why it took decades 
before the Copernican system gained wider acceptance (Copernicus also lacked 
a workable physics for a moving Earth). Regardless, the Copernican system was 
much less ad hoc, as compared to the Ptolemaic system, when it came to 
accounting for observations regarding the planets, the sun, and the moon (it, for 
example, explained in a non-ad hoc fashion the fact that only the planets, but 
not the sun and the moon, retrogress, and why the frequency of planetary 
retrogressions decreases from Saturn, Jupiter, and Mars, and increases from 
Venus to Mercury, and that the superior planets are the brightest in their 
opposition (Copernicus 1543/1992, 26-7)). Thus, we can say that the Copernican 
system, when it was first proposed, constituted an improvement with regards 
to the number of ad hoc assumptions it had to invoke in accounting for many 
planetary observations, which made it preferable over the Ptolemaic system. At 
the same time, the Copernican system too had to make do with a number of ad 
hoc assumptions before it was eventually developed into a system coherent 
with accepted physics. Thus, the CCAH account, although allowing the basis of 
comparative theory-choice on the basis of degrees of ad hocness, does not 
suggest simplified algorithms that do not adequately mirror the complextity of 
history.  
Of course, there are other important considerations in theory choice than 
ad hocness. Most importantly, a theory needs to be empirically adequate. And if 
we do not find a theory that is empirically adequate and non-ad hoc, clearly, we 
should stick to it in any case if it is empirically adequate. I think this is what can 
be said about the Higgs mechanism after the Higgs discovery, which we 
discussed in Section 2.2. There is another historical example, which I now want 
to consider briefly.  
Planck famously introduced the concept of quantization of energy into 
physics in an ad hoc fashion in order to account for black body radiation. He 
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himself was not very happy about that and physicists worked for decades to 
devise a theory that gives us good reasons for the quantization of energy (Kuhn 
1987). Thus, although undesirable, ad hoc hypotheses can drive progress not 
only by way of helping scientists to save the phenomena but also by way of 
giving incentives to develop theories which render those very same hypotheses 
non-ad hoc (by providing good reasons for believing in them). Accordingly, the 
view of norms that recommends itself is not one where methodological norms 
are categorical, but rather conditional and ceteris paribus. That is, the norm not 
to devise ad hoc hypotheses has to be weighed against other norms such as 
“seek hypotheses that are empirically adequate”. It can therefore not always be 
wrong to devise ad hoc hypotheses; it is admissible when no other hypotheses 
are available. It is nevertheless always desirable to devise hypotheses that are 
not ad hoc, as the aforementioned example illustrates.  
 Let us turn to the example of the Higgs mechanism discussed by 
Friedrich et al. (2014) and recall that they report the following grounds on 
which it has been deemed ad hoc by physicists: (i) it possesses a large number 
of free parameters, (ii) there are no other fundamental scalar particles than the 
Higgs boson, (iii) the symmetry breaking of the Higgs mechanism is different 
from all other known cases of symmetry breaking, and (iv) the Higgs particle is 
‘fine tuned’ to its interaction mass and unexplained. As we saw in Section 2.2, 
there is no evidence that the independent support of the Higgs mechanism in 
the form of the discovery of the Higgs boson changed physicists’ view of the ad 
hocness of the Higgs mechanism. In contrast, CCAH accommodates these 
observations in the following way: (i) and (iv) fall under the heading of “T 
provides no reason for believing that H”, and (ii) and (iii) are instances where 
“B provides no reason for believing that H”, as our background theories give us 
no reason why there ought to be only one fundamental scalar particle and why 
symmetry breaking may proceed differently only in the Higgs mechanism.  
 In Section 2.2, we mentioned further examples which seem to undermine 
the independent support view of ad hocness. One may nevertheless wonder 
whether one could perhaps hold CCAH in conjunction with the independent 
support condition, in case the independent support condition would get its 
plausibility from other examples.22 First of all, I think it would be important for 
                                                
22 I owe this objection and one of my replies to the two referees for this journal. 
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the proponents of the independent support account to provide examples that 
show that independent support is indeed a concern that scientists have when 
they deem a hypothesis ad hoc for us to feel forced to consider such a 
possibility seriously. But we can of course ponder this possibility in the abstract.  
 On the independent support view of ad hocness, it is sufficient that a 
hypothesis H have independent support for it to be non-ad hoc (likewise, a 
hypothesis must have independent support for it not to be ad hoc). Yet, on my 
account, what is needed for H not to be ad hoc is that there are theoretical 
reasons for belief in H. Independent empirical support is thus not sufficient for 
non-ad hocness, on my account. In fact, it’s not even necessary: even when a 
hypothesis does not have independent empirical support (but only the evidence 
it was invoked for), it could count as not ad hoc on my account (namely exactly 
when there are theoretical reasons for belief in H). So my coherentist conception 
and the independent support notion appear to be incompatible.          
Let us now consider the relation of the CCHA to another account of ad 
hocness. Coherence is intuitively closely related to unfiedness. But although 
several writers have gestured at a lack of unifiedness when discussing ad hoc 
features of theories, a precise account of what this would amount to is as of yet 
wanting.23 Suppose the rough idea is that an explanation is unified if it explains 
a set of phenomena with a small amount of basic assumptions or principles and 
say that we possessed a particular unified explanation / theory of a certain set of 
phenomena (Kitcher 1981). Would that mean that none of the phenomena in that 
set could be accommodated in an ad hoc fashion by the relevant theory? Or 
                                                
23 I think Leplin’s non-fundamentality assumption implicitly appeals to the idea that ad hoc 
hypotheses are those that are not unified with the theory in question (Leplin 1975). Cf. footnote 
3. More recently, Boudry and Leuridan (2011), in their criticism of Sober (2008), seem to be 
sympathetic to this idea. As mentioned in fn. 16, McMullin associates ad hocness with the 
absence of coherence, which he seems to think of in terms of lack of unifiedness. Lastly, Lipton 
may also be ascribed some version of this view. Lipton (1991/2004) has argued for the 
predictivist thesis that a theory’s predictive success should count more than a theory’s 
accommodative success, because there is motivation to “force” the theory to accommodate the 
evidence and we therefore have reason to suspect that the theory is “fudged” when 
accommodated. In contrast, scientists generate predictions from their theories “on the basis of 
the most natural and most explanatory theory” (170-9). Lipton admits that it is a “clear 
limitation” of his account “that it does not include anything like a precise characterization of the 
features that make one theoretical system fudgier than another” (180), but does briefly mention 
that, for him, a fudged theory “becomes more like an arbitrary conjunction, less like a unified 
theory” (171; added emphasis).  
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would it mean only at least some of the phenomena would not be 
accommodated in an ad hoc fashion? The former is implausibly restrictive: 
many highly unifying theories make ad hoc assumptions (see e.g. the standard 
model and our discussion of the Higgs mechanism in this paper). But if it’s only 
some phenomena, what is it in the unification account that determines which 
phenomena are not ad hoc with regard to a unifying theory? In other words, the 
unification account of ad hocness has an unspecificity problem. This problem is 
absent on the CCAH. In fact, unification and CCAH are nicely complementary: 
a unified theory can be coherent to one or another degree, and vice versa, a 
coherent theory can be unified or not (or maybe unified to one or the other 
degree).24 At the same time, a unified theory will never lack potential coherence, 
as it presumably will give reasons for believing in at least some of the lower 
level hypotheses about the phenomena which it unifies (for actual coherence to 
obtain those reasons must of course be good reasons).    
There is another problem of the unification account that the coherence 
account avoids. As mentioned, unification is usually understood as capturing a 
number of phenomena with relatively few assumptions. Unification accounts of 
ad hocness view the need to invoke ad hoc hypotheses for a theory to 
accommodate the relevant evidence (roughly) as a sign for the lack of 
unifiedness of a theory. But this idea is not unproblematic. Suppose we have 
two sets of phenomena P1 and P2 and two theories, A and B, both of which 
manage to accommodate P1 and P2, albeit in different ways. Whereas A 
accounts for both P1 and P2 in terms of its own basic assumptions, B 
accommodates P1 but must to invoke additional hypotheses in order to be able 
accommodate P2. Intuitively we would want to prefer A over B. Does the 
unificationist account provide the right resources for justifying this preference? 
First of all note that A and B accommodate the same sets of phenomena. 
Whether A or B would count as unifying, by the lights of the unificationist 
account, therefore hinges on the number of principles invoked. Yet, determining 
this number and whether or not A or B is superior in that regard is by no means 
a trivial task: as we know from Duhem, both B and A will have to invoke a 
multitude of auxiliary assumptions in order to be able to accommodate the 
                                                
24 It has in fact be argued that unification accounts subscribe to a “the winner take all” 
conception of explanation according to which an explanation either is or is not explanatory, 
without allowing for degrees of explanation (Woodward 2014).  
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phenomena, all of which will have to figure in the final count of assumptions. 
We can therefore not know in advance whether B or (the intuitively preferable) 
A would come out as more unifying. But this indeterminacy is not tolerable on 
an account that seeks to provide a principled way of analyzing ad hocness. The 
proponent of the unificationist account may be able to address this problem by 
giving us a principled way of distinguishing between fundamental and less 
fundamental assumptions in a theory, but before this is achieved the coherence 
account must seem superior to the unificationist account of ad hocness.25 To this 
we may add that the unification account, contrary to CCAH, cannot 
accommodate the fact that background knowledge seems to play a role in ad 
hoc judgements, as in the case of the Higgs mechanism (see above). 
As mentioned at the very beginning of this essay, some philosophers view 
ad hocness as the converse of predictive success (Worrall 2002). So, one may 
ask, how does the CCAH account relate to predictive success, and in particular 
the thesis that predictive success is better evidence for a theory than 
accommodative success? On CCAH, there is no asymmetry between evidence 
that is predicted and evidence that is accommodated. In both cases, CCAH 
requires good reasons for the hypothesis invoked to predict or accommodate E. 
So for example, when Einstein, in 1915, was able to derive from the theory of 
general relativity (T) that light would bend around massive objects such as stars 
(H), the theory provided reasons for believing in the existence of star light 
bending, which motivated Eddington and others to go out and collect 
observational evidence (E) for H. In contrast, the Ptolemaic system, which we 
briefly considered above, can for example predict that the inner planets will not 
be observed beyond a certain angle from the sun, but it gives no good reasons 
for believing in this prediction (because its stipulation of coordination of the 
position of the sun, Earth, and the centre of an inner planet’s epicycle cohere 
neither with the theory itself or the background knowledge). Thus, although the 
Ptolemaic system is able to make successful predictions regarding maximum 
elongation, the basis on which it does this is objectionable. Predictive success 
therefore does not secure against ad hocness.26 
                                                
25 In fact, Worrall has struggled with this question and concludes that there is no good way of 
doing so (Worrall 1989, 2002, 2005).  
26 It should be noted that this point does not apply to all accounts of predictive success that can 
be found in the literature. Although it does apply to the intuitive notion of temporally 
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Finally, one might perhaps be worried that the CCAH could commit one 
to a coherentist epistemology for science with all its well-known and highly 
problematic implications. But that is not the case. Coherentism is the view that a 
belief is justified if and only if it coheres with other beliefs. Nothing in the CCAH 
would imply that much. On the contrary, I believe that theories and hypotheses 
in science are justified when they are supported by the relevant evidence, just as 
foundationalism has it. Nevertheless those support relations, on CCAH, will be 
stronger or weaker depending on the amount of coherence between the 
hypothesis and the theory in question. In other words, the coherence relations 
modify the support relations. The epistemology to be associated with the CCAH 
may therefore be referred to as weak foundationalism (Olsson 2012).  
5 The	Lorentz-FitzGerald	contraction	hypothesis	revisited	
According to the CCAH, theoretical reasons for belief are crucial for 
determining whether a hypothesis is ad hoc nor not. In this section I will argue 
that Lorentz sought to render the contraction hypothesis, a paradigmatic 
example for an ad hoc hypothesis, non-ad hoc by providing theoretical reasons 
for belief for it. I take this to confirm the CCAH.  
In the analysis of the LFC, one must distinguish between an early and a 
later, mature, version. The early version was proposed in cursory form by 
Lorentz in 1895 (and by FitzGerald around the same time) in a short section in 
the final chapter of a 139-page strong book, the mature version in 1904.  Many 
philosophers of science, for various reasons, believe that the ad hoc charge 
applies only to the early, but not to the mature version of the LFC (Zahar 1973, 
Grünbaum 1976, Janssen 2002b, Acuña 2014). This is consistent with scientists 
such as Einstein deeming the early, but not necessarily the later version of LFC, 
ad hoc (Holton 1969, 169).  
In the early version of LFC, Lorentz assumed that (i) “molecular forces are 
also transmitted through the ether, like the electric and magnetic forces of 
                                                
predictive success, it does not apply to others, like Alai’s notion of functional novelty, according 
to which a piece of evidence is novel with regard to a theory T (which entails E) if the use of E is 
not essential for the construction of T (Alai 2014). On Alai’s account, Ptolemy’s predictions 
would not count as novel, because its predictions are premised on a theory which was 
constructed under the essential use of the phenomena it predicts. Alai’s account bears close 
resemblance to one version of Worrall’s use-novelty account (see ibid. for more details). I thank 
one of the referees for this journal for pressing me to qualify my claim.  
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which we are able at the present time to make this assertion definitely”, that (ii) 
the ‘attraction and repulsion’ of molecular forces for a body at rest would be in 
equilibrium, and that (iii) the Lorentz transformations would apply not only to 
electrostatic forces, but also to the ‘molecular forces’ holding together matter 
(Lorentz 1875 in Einstein et al. 1952, 6). As Lorentz readily admitted himself, 
“there is no reason” in his theory for making the latter assumption in particular. 
And assumption (ii) is highly implausible (cf. Janssen 2002b, 437).  
Some commentators have emphasized that Lorentz’s remarks were 
specifically catered to the Michelson-Morley experiment and that Lorentz 
articulated the LFC in more general terms only in the later 1904 publication, 
where he also managed to derive the second order effects he needed to account 
for the Michelson-Morley experiment (Schaffner 1974, Janssen 2002b).27 The 
mature formulation of the LFC entailed consequences which the early version 
didn’t (or at least not explicitly), such as the velocity-dependence of mass 
(Janssen 2002b, 425). That consequence was of course testable. It is also for this 
reason that some philosophers have claimed that the mature LFC was not ad 
hoc (e.g. Acuña 2014).  
But even the mature LFC, it has been argued, is at fault. According to 
Janssen (2002b): 
In Lorentz’s theory, there is a strict separation of ether and matter […] Lorentz 
decreed a number of important exceptions to the Galilean-invariant Newtonian 
laws that are supposed to govern matter, so that the laws effectively governing 
matter are Lorentz invariant. Why, one can legitimately ask, would the laws 
governing matter have the property of Lorentz invariance, which so far 
appeared to be nothing but a peculiar property of Maxwell’s equations? […] In 
the final analysis, it is thus left an unexplained coincidence in Lorentz’s theory 
that both matter and fields are governed by laws that are Lorentz invariant 
[whereas in Einstein’s theory of special relativity, it isn’t]. (p. 423 and 426, 
added emphasis) 
Janssen (2002a) cites for approval Poincaré’s dismissal of the LFC in his 
introduction of Sur la dynamique de l’electron (1906): 
                                                
27 For Janssen (2002b, 425) the “generalised” LFC is the following: “a matter configuration 
producing a certain field configuration in a frame at rest in the ether will, when the system is set 
in motion, change into the matter configuration producing the corresponding state of that field 
configuration in the frame moving with the system.” 
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We cannot content ourselves with simply juxtaposing formulas that would 
agree only by some happy coincidence; the formulas should, so to say, 
penetrate each other.  
And indeed, also in the mature theory Lorentz was merely assuming that the 
Lorentz transformations would apply to ‘molecular forces’, holding together 
matter, in the same way they applied to electrostatic forces (Lorentz 1904 in 
Einstein et al. 1952, 22).  
Janssen does not link this perceived deficit of Lorentz’s theory to 
judgments about LFC being ad hoc. Indeed, he concludes that “a solid case can 
be made for the claim that [Lorentz’s mature] theory is not ad hoc by any of the 
criteria considered here” (ibid., 437). Instead he regards the above shortcoming 
as a different reason for why Lorentz’s theory was inferior to Einstein’s.28 Yet I 
don’t see why one ought to keep those reasons separate. After all, already in the 
publication of the early LFC version, as we mentioned before, Lorentz admitted 
that “there is no reason” to suppose (as he did) that the Lorentz transformations 
should apply also to matter. But if that’s so, then it’s not too implausible to 
suppose that this is also what Einstein and others objected to when deeming the 
(early) LFC ad hoc.   
It is also interesting to note that Lorentz, in a letter to Einstein in 1915, 
i.e., 10 years after proposing his mature theory, stated his belief that the LFC 
was rendered non-ad hoc by his offering an explanation for it in terms of 
molecular forces: 
[…] I had added that one can arrive at this hypothesis [i.e., the LFC], if one 
extrapolates from what one was able to say about the influence of translation on 
electrostatic forces to other forces. Had I stressed it more, the hypothesis would have 
made less of an impression of having been devised ad hoc” (Lorentz 1915 in 
Schulmann et al. 1998, 71-2).29 
What Lorentz had said in 1875, again, was 
that [the LFC] is by no means far-fetched, as soon as we assume that molecular 
forces are also transmitted through the ether, like electric and magnetic forces of 
which we are able at present time to make this assertion definitely […] From the 
                                                
28 See Acuña (2014) for a detailed criticism of Janssen’s account. 
29 This is my own translation of the original German text. 
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theoretical side, therefore, there would be no objection to this hypothesis 
(Lorentz in Einstein et al. 1952, 6, added emphasis). 
So what Lorentz appeared to have thought was that the LFC lost its ad hoc 
character at the moment when he was able to lend to it some theoretical 
plausibility. And this Lorentz thought despite the fact that he at the same time 
admitted that he had devised the molecular forces explanation only after he had 
come up with the LFC (Lorentz 1915 in Schulmann et al. 1998, 74). Although we 
don’t know what Einstein made of that suggestion,30 Lorentz doesn’t seem to be 
alone with this judgement. Leplin (1975, fn. 18 p. 314-5) points out, for example, 
that two later textbooks (one from 1924 and one from 1969) seem to suggest that 
“Lorentz’s representation of contraction as a condition of molecular equilibrium 
mitigated its ad hoc character”.31  
5.1.1 Assessment	
From the point of view of CCAH, what Lorentz appeared to have sought to do 
in order to diminish the ad hoc status of the LFC was to establish a coherence 
relation between the LFC and the rest of the ether theory.32 More specifically, 
Lorentz sought to offer a causal mechanism for LFC. That he achieved only to a 
limited degree. Although there perhaps was some plausibility in assuming that 
the molecular forces that Lorentz postulated for matter would behave not 
unlike the electromagnetic forces “since both types of force are states of the 
same substratum”, as (Zahar 1973, 116) put it, it remained highly curious how 
this was to be achieved. As mentioned above, the ‘molecular forces’ hypothesis 
required that there be an electrostatic equilibrium when a body is at rest. But 
there is no such thing as electrostatic equilibrium (cf. Janssen 2002b). Thus, 
although Lorentz was able to provide some theoretical reasons to believe that 
LFC, he wasn’t able to provide good theoretical reasons. His attempted 
                                                
30 In his reply to Lorentz, Einstein did not mention the issue (Schulmann et al. 1998). 
31 Zahar (1973) suggests it is for this reason that the LFC is not to be regarded ad hoc. Zahar 
claims that Lorentz was able to ‘derive’ the LFC from the molecular force hypothesis. But that’s 
not the case. Lorentz offered only a ‘plausibility’ argument, no derivation (Janssen 2002b, 436-7). 
In his mature theory, Lorentz derived the length contraction from what Janssen calls the 
generalised LFC (see fn. 27, above). 
32 One might be tempted to interpret Lorentz’s molecular forces hypothesis as an attempt to 
produce an explanation that would engender novel predictions and that it was for the latter 
reason, not for the former, that Lorentz thought the LFC was rendered non-ad hoc. But, as we 
already noted in Section 2 with Holton, independent predictions of the LFC “were not urged as 
tests that would decide on its acceptability” (Holton 1969, 177).   
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explanation of the LFC in terms of molecular forces did not establish coherence 
with either the ether theory nor with the background theories.  
6 Conclusion	
The historical cases discussed in this paper support a new conception of ad 
hocness, namely the coherentist conception of ad hocness, which has several 
conceptual and descriptive advantages over its competitors.  
 Getting the concept of ad hocness right could have a number of 
ramifications for other philosophical debates, first and foremost debates 
concerning theory-confirmation, but also the realism debate. How would 
current accounts of confirmation be affected by the results of the present study? 
Could realists exploit the idea that theories which are less ad hoc are better 
confirmed than theories that possess more ad hoc elements? Answers to these 
intriguing questions will have to await further research.  
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